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BEYOND TORTURE: THE NEMO TENETUR 
PRINCIPLE IN BORDERLINE CASES 
Luis E. Chiesa* 
Abstract: The Latin phrase nemo tenetur seipsum accusare means roughly “no 
man has to accuse himself.” It is the basis of our rights against self-
incrimination and forced inculpation. It protects against three practical 
problems associated with confessions: (1) untrustworthy confessions; (2) 
involuntary confessions; and (3) confessions provoked through unaccept-
able force. This article argues that the Nemo tenetur principle was intended 
primarily to avoid the third problem: confessions obtained through im-
proper methods. It examines the arguments for and against justifying the 
principle as a protection against either untrustworthy or involuntary con-
fessions. The article also develops a framework to aid in the identification 
of improper methods of interrogation. Finally, it concludes by applying 
this framework to three hypothetical cases and arguing that only confes-
sions obtained through unacceptable force should be barred. 
Introduction—Three Borderline Cases 
 The maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare (the “Nemo tenetur princi-
ple”) comes from Latin and is usually translated as “no one need accuse 
himself.”1 In the United States, this principle is often identified with 
the right against self-incrimination.2 In civil law countries, the Nemo 
tenetur principle guarantees at least five rights of the defendant in a 
                                                                                                                      
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. This article draws upon 
and further elaborates on the ideas first espoused in a lecture delivered at an international 
criminal procedure conference held in Mexico City in October 2008. 
1 See also Mark A. Godsey, Rethinking the Involuntary Confession Rule: Toward a Workable 
Test for Identifying Compelled Self-Incrimination, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 465, 479 (2005) (tracing the 
development of the Nemo tenetur principle from the use of “imprisonment, exile, and 
physical torture to punish silence and to provoke suspects to confess to heresy and other 
crimes”). See generally Claus Roxin, La Evolución de la Política Criminal, el Derecho 
Penal y el Proceso Penal 123–38 (Tirant Lo Blanch ed., Gómez Rivero & García Canti-
zano trans., 2000) (author trans.). 
2 See Roxin, supra note 1, at 123–38; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442–43 
(1965) (quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596–97 (1896)) (discussing the origin of 
the Nemo tenetur principle and how it became part of fundamental constitutional law); God-
sey, supra note 1, at 480 (noting that “the doctrine of Nemo tenetur and its abhorrence of the 
government use of torture and coercive interrogation techniques drove the self-
incrimination clause’s ultimate inclusion in the Bill of Rights”). 
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criminal trial: (1) the right to remain silent; (2) the right not to be 
called to testify; (3) the right to speak to an attorney before incriminat-
ing oneself; (4) the right not to be coerced into inculpating oneself; 
and (5) the right not to incriminate oneself in a judicial proceeding.3 
 The main evil the Nemo tenetur principle seeks to avoid is the offi-
cial use of torture as a means for obtaining incriminating testimony.4 
The rationale behind excluding self-incriminating statements obtained 
through the use of torture can be explained in three different ways. 
First, confessions obtained by force or violence may not be trustworthy, 
because a suspect ordinarily would be willing to say anything to stop 
such mistreatment.5 Second, using torture to obtain incriminating 
statements violates a suspect’s autonomy and undermines the volun-
                                                                                                                      
3 See Roxin, supra note 1, at 123–38. Although the United States Constitution protects 
the same rights, not all derive from the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-
incrimination. See U.S. Const. amend. V; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471–74 (holding that 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination affords suspects in custodial in-
terrogation the right to counsel); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206–07 (1964) 
(holding that the government may not deliberately elicit incriminating statements from a 
suspect after initiation of criminal proceedings against him unless the suspect’s attorney is 
present). For example, the right not to be coerced into incriminating oneself derives from 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses. See U.S. Const. amends. V, 
XIV. Additionally, the right to speak to an attorney before incriminating oneself comes 
partly from the protection against self-incrimination and partly from a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to be assisted by counsel. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471–74 (holding that 
the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination affords suspects in custodial 
interrogation the right to counsel); Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205–07 (holding that the govern-
ment may not deliberately elicit incriminating statements from a suspect after initiation of 
criminal proceedings against him unless the suspect’s attorney is present). 
Therefore, strictly speaking, the right against self-incrimination does not have the 
same scope in civil law countries and in the United States. See Kai Ambos, The Right of Non-
Self-Incrimination of Witnesses Before the ICC, 15 Leiden J. Int’l L. 155, 166 (2002). This arti-
cle uses the term Nemo tenetur to include all five rights, which is broader than it is generally 
used in the United States. See id. at 159–62. Ultimately, what matters is that, regardless of 
their source, the guarantees derived from the Nemo tenetur principle are legally binding 
both in the United States and continental Europe. See Godsey, supra note 1, at 479–81; 
Ambos, supra, at 166. 
4 See Godsey, supra note 1, at 479–81. 
5 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1966) (“The privilege against self-incrimination is, of 
course, related to the question of the safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or 
confessions are reasonably trustworthy, that they are not the mere fruits of fear or coer-
cion, but are reliable expressions of the truth.”). Early cases addressing the admissibility of 
confessions in state criminal trials required exclusion of such confessions primarily (and 
perhaps exclusively) because of their unreliability, but as the course of adjudication pro-
ceeded, it became clear that confessions would be held “involuntary” and hence inadmis-
sible, even when their reliability was clearly established. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 
U.S. 278, 285–87 (1936). Indeed, in 1961, in Rogers v. Richmond, the Supreme Court held 
that a court assessing a voluntariness claim could not even consider the fact that the police 
tactics would not tend to produce a false confession. 365 U.S. 534, 543–44 (1961). 
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tariness of the confession.6 Third, it is inappropriate for the govern-
ment to use torture as an interrogation technique.7 If torture is used to 
extract a confession, the trustworthiness of the confession is doubtful, 
the involuntariness of the confession is obvious, and the appropriate-
ness of the officers’ conduct is questionable. If all three justifications 
for excluding a confession are present, then the confession will likely 
not be admitted into evidence. If, however, the confession is either 
trustworthy, voluntary, or obtained without resorting to inappropriate 
conduct, the inadmissibility of such confession is less clear. Consider 
the following three examples: 
The False Confession Case. John goes to the police and confesses 
to having committed murder. The evidence gathered by the 
police overwhelmingly suggests that John falsely confessed 
in order to protect Joseph, his son and chief suspect of the 
crime. 
The Truth Serum Case. Luke dissolves several pills of Amytal, a 
truth serum, into Peter’s drink. Peter, unaware that it con-
tains the substance, takes the drink. A couple of hours later, 
Peter is lawfully arrested and interrogated by the police 
about his possible participation in a robbery. Peter, who had 
participated in the robbery, confesses to his role. The police 
do not know and have no reason to suspect Peter is under 
the influence of Amytal. Later investigation reveals inde-
pendent evidence which fully confirms Peter’s confession. 
The Unnecessary Threat Case. Maria is arrested and interrogated 
by the police. Just as Maria begins to confess, a police offi-
cer interrupts her, threatening to beat her up if she does 
not incriminate herself. Maria then makes several inculpa-
                                                                                                                      
6 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433–34 (2000) (summarizing the role of 
the voluntariness test in confession jurisprudence through the past century); Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285–86 (1991); 2 Edward J. Imwinkelried et al., Courtroom 
Criminal Evidence § 2303 (3d ed. 1998) (“To successfully offer an admission or confes-
sion into evidence, the prosecutor must comply with . . . the voluntariness doctrine . . . . 
The voluntariness doctrine requires that admissions and confessions be shown to have 
been made voluntarily.”); Wayne R. Lafave et al., Criminal Procedure § 6.2(b) (3d ed. 
2000) (“This due process test is customarily referred to as the ‘voluntariness’ requirement, 
the term used by the Court in enunciating the due process requisites for admissibility.”). 
7 See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 843 n.33 (1985) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (“The great advantage of police compliance with the law is that it helps to create 
an atmosphere conducive to community respect for officers of the law that in turn serves 
to promote their enforcement of the law.”) (quoting Roger J. Traynor, Lawbreakers, Courts, 
and Law-Abiders, 41 J. St. B. Cal. 458, 478 (1966)). 
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tory statements. Other evidence introduced by the state at 
trial corroborates these statements. At her trial, Maria’s 
counsel makes a motion to suppress the confession. During 
the hearing on that motion, Maria testifies that the police 
officer’s threat did not influence her decision to confess. 
 In the first example, the false confession case, the main reason to ex-
clude the incriminating statements is that there are good reasons to 
believe that they might be false.8 John’s decision to confess, however, 
was completely voluntary. Moreover, the police did not use any inap-
propriate interrogation techniques to extract the confession. 
 The second example, the truth serum case, presents a different 
problem. Peter’s confession was independently corroborated by the 
officers. As such, it cannot be excluded on the grounds that it lacks 
probative value.9 Furthermore, because the officers were unaware that 
Peter had taken Amytal, they could not have intentionally taken advan-
tage of its effects. Consequently, the confession cannot be excluded on 
the grounds that the officers used inappropriate interrogation meth-
ods. The most powerful argument to exclude this confession is that it 
was involuntary, since the truth serum substantially diminished Peter’s 
ability to freely choose whether or not to confess. 
 Finally, in the third example, the unnecessary threat case, the confes-
sion can be challenged because of the inappropriate methods used in 
interrogation. In that example, the confession is clearly trustworthy. 
Moreover, Maria’s testimony during the suppression hearing reveals 
that the officers’ threat did not influence her decision to confess and 
                                                                                                                      
8 See Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411, 413 (1942) (holding that “conviction through the 
use of perjured testimony . . . violates civilized standards for the trial of guilt or innocence 
and thereby deprives an accused of liberty without due process of law”) (citation omitted); 
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1935) (holding that the use by a state of testi-
mony known by its “prosecuting authorities” to be false is a denial of due process of law). 
But see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166 (1986) (explaining that courts should not 
have to “divine a defendant’s motion for speaking or acting as he did even though there 
be no claim that governmental conduct coerced his decision”); Lisenba v. California, 314 
U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (“The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude pre-
sumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, 
whether true or false.”). See generally Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: 
Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 105, 121–35 (1997) 
(giving examples of potentially false confessions and analyzing the interrogation strategies 
in certain cases). 
9 See Hysler, 315 U.S. at 420–22; Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112; see also White, supra note 8, at 
111 (“Interrogation methods likely to lead to untrustworthy confessions should be prohib-
ited, and safeguards designed to reduce the likelihood that false confessions will be admit-
ted . . . should be adopted.”). 
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therefore that her confession was entirely voluntary. As a result, the best 
argument in favor of suppressing this confession is that the police used 
an inappropriate method of interrogation.10 
 Whether the confessions in these three examples violate the Nemo 
tenetur principle depends on whether the main purpose of this safe-
guard is: (1) to exclude untrustworthy evidence; (2) to protect the sus-
pect’s autonomy; or (3) to prohibit the use of inappropriate methods 
of interrogation.11 This Article argues that the main justification of the 
Nemo tenetur principle is as a protection against the use of improper 
methods of investigation. Under this interpretation, the confessions in 
the false confession case and the truth serum case do not violate the Nemo 
tenetur principle.12 In contrast, under this interpretation, the confession 
in the unnecessary threat case did violate this principle because although 
the statement in that example was trustworthy and voluntary, the 
methods of interrogation used by the officers were inappropriate. The 
argument will be developed in three parts. 
 Part I of the article argues that the Nemo tenetur principle should 
not be justified solely as a protection against the admission of untrust-
worthy confessions. First, it examines the counterarguments in favor of 
justifying the principle primarily as a protection against untrustworthy 
confessions. Second, it discusses Spano v. New York in which the Supreme 
Court suggested the Nemo tenetur principle should not be justified alone 
on the trustworthiness or untrustworthiness of a confession.13 As such, 
this part concludes that there is no necessary connection between a 
confession’s trustworthiness and its admissibility and therefore that the 
                                                                                                                      
10 See infra Part III, for a discussion of what constitutes an inappropriate method of in-
terrogation. See also Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 38 (1967) (suggesting threats of 
force were inappropriate); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958) (suggesting prom-
ises of protection from force were inappropriate); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 
158–59 (1944) (holding that thirty-six hours of continuous interrogation is “inherently 
coercive”); Brown, 297 U.S. at 285–87 (suggesting confessions induced by force were inap-
propriate). 
11 See 3 John Henry Wigmore, Wigmore on Evidence § 824 (1st ed. 1904); Godsey, 
supra note 1, at 479–81; George C. Thomas III, Regulating Police Deception During Interroga-
tion, 39 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 1293, 1296–99 (2007); White, supra note 8, at 111–12 (describ-
ing the evolution of untrustworthy and involuntary justifications in Nemo tenetur analysis). 
12 This does not mean that there are no arguments in favor of excluding these confes-
sions. In the false confession case, for example, one could justify excluding the confession 
not because it was obtained in violation of the Nemo tenetur principle, but because it is false. 
See Hysler, 315 U.S. at 413; Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112; see also White, supra note 8, at 156 (con-
cluding that interrogation methods leading to false confessions violate due process). 
13 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959). 
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Nemo tenetur principle should not be justified primarily as a protection 
against untrustworthy statements.14 
 Part II advances three arguments against using the voluntariness of 
the confession as the standard to determine whether it has been ob-
tained in violation of the Nemo tenetur principle. The first part argues 
that most, if not all, legal systems sanction methods of interrogation 
which call into question the voluntariness of a suspect’s confession. The 
second part argues that the involuntariness of a confession is deter-
mined almost entirely by normative criteria, based on society’s legiti-
mate expectations of moral strength.15 The third part discusses recent 
developments in neuroscience suggesting that human behavior is most 
likely determined almost entirely by factors outside an individual’s con-
trol. It then asserts that if these findings were true, every human act 
would be considered involuntary. Consequently, examining the “volun-
tariness” of a statement would be a pointless endeavor. 
 Part III argues that the main purpose of the Nemo tenetur principle 
is to curb inappropriate police conduct. It contends that the appropri-
ateness of the interrogation methods used by the state should be evalu-
ated before looking to the statement’s trustworthiness or the suspect’s 
freedom of choice at the time of the confession. From this conclusion, 
                                                                                                                      
14 See Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1954). For example, uncorrobo-
rated confessions are typically unreliable, although they might have been obtained by 
methods that are perfectly compatible with the Nemo tenetur principle. See id. Conversely, 
many confessions obtained by torture are later corroborated and are, therefore, reliable. It 
would be a mistake, however, to conclude that because a confession obtained by physical 
coercion was trustworthy, it did not violate the Nemo tenetur principle. 
It is important to distinguish between the admissibility of an uncorroborated confes-
sion and the sufficiency of an uncorroborated confession necessary to establish a convic-
tion. Compare Smith, 348 U.S. at 152–53, and Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342, 345–
47 (1941), with Ray v. State, 615 S.E.2d 812, 817 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (explaining that when 
evaluating sufficiency of a conviction, a court does not weigh the evidence or credibility), 
and Commonwealth v. Kimball, 73 N.E.2d 468, 470 (Mass. 1947) (“The trend . . . is in the 
direction of eliminating quantitative tests of sufficiency of evidence.”). Although most 
jurisdictions allow uncorroborated confessions to be admitted into evidence, a majority 
hold that that a defendant’s uncorroborated incriminating statements are not sufficient 
evidence to sustain a conviction. See, e.g., Smith, 348 U.S. at 156; Warszower, 312 U.S. at 347–
48. A minority of jurisdictions, however, allow the state to secure a conviction solely on the 
basis of an uncorroborated statement. See, e.g., Ray, 615 S.E.2d at 816–17; Kimball, 73 
N.E.2d at 470. The Supreme Court in Smith stated that the purpose of requiring corrobo-
rating evidence is to “prevent ‘errors in convictions based upon untrue confessions’” and 
to exclude statements that although “not . . . involuntary within the meaning of [the due 
process protections against coerced confessions],” are of suspect reliability. Smith, 348 U.S. 
at 153 (quoting Warszower, 312 U.S. at 347). 
15 See Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its 
Proper Limits, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1331, 1334 (1989). 
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it reasons that the question of whether an interrogation violates the 
Nemo tenetur principle is above all a normative one. In other words, the 
relevant question is whether the confession was obtained by interroga-
tion techniques that are incompatible with the fundamental values that 
inform the United States’ system of justice. 
 Part III also develops a framework to assist in the identification of 
interrogation methods which violate the rights guaranteed by the Nemo 
tenetur principle. The four categories of improper methods included in 
this theoretical framework are: (1) exploitation of a suspect by the police; 
(2) physical or psychological coercion of a suspect; (3) certain kinds of 
deception; and (4) the transgression of a mutually agreed upon rule to ob-
tain an unfair advantage over a suspect.16 Finally, the article concludes 
by applying this framework to the three hypothetical cases outlined 
above and argues that only the confession obtained through improper 
methods should be barred. 
I. The Nemo Tenetur Principle and the Confession’s 
Trustworthiness 
 The Nemo tenetur principle should not be justified primarily as a 
protection against the admission of untrustworthy confessions.17 An ex-
amination in favor of this approach reveals the danger in making the 
inadmissibility of a confession hinge on its trustworthiness.18 Were the 
principle justified primarily as a protection against untrustworthy state-
ments, then the admissibility of a confession would depend primarily on 
its trustworthiness.19 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has said 
that the right against self-incrimination, derived from the Nemo tenetur 
principle, cannot be justified solely as a protection against the admission 
                                                                                                                      
16 The clearest cases of exploitation occur when the police deliberately place the suspect 
in a condition of defenselessness or ignorance with the purpose of taking advantage of 
him. See Stuart P. Green, Lying, Cheating, and Stealing 95 (2006). The paradigmatic 
example of physical coercion employed against the suspect is torture. See id. at 93–95. It is 
unclear whether the use of all types of deception should be considered incompatible with 
the Nemo tenetur principle. See id. at 95; see also infra Part III. It may be worth distinguishing, 
for example, between lying to obtain a confession and misleading the suspect into confess-
ing. See Green, supra, at 95; see also infra Part III. A case of transgression takes place when the 
police obtain a confession from a defendant without allowing him to speak with his attor-
ney or when the defendant gives up his right to legal representation after the criminal 
proceedings have begun. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206–07; see also infra Part III. 
17 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320–21 (1950). 
18 See id. 
19 See id. 
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of untrustworthy confessions.20 As such, for a confession to be deemed 
inadmissible, it need not be deemed untrustworthy.21 
A. The Emergence of Trustworthiness as a Yardstick for Determining the 
Admissibility of a Confession 
 One of the earliest cases in which a U.S. court held a confession 
inadmissible because it had been obtained by torture was Hector v. State, 
which the Missouri Supreme Court decided in 1829.22 In that case, the 
defendant, a slave, had been arrested for burglary.23 He was interro-
gated and beaten “all night.”24 During the course of this beating, Hector 
confessed to the burglary and said that if the police “would release him 
he would find the [missing] money.”25 When he was released, however, 
he was not able to locate it.26 At trial, Hector’s counsel moved to sup-
press the confession and other statements made during the interroga-
tion.27 The trial court denied the motion and admitted the statements 
as evidence.28 
 In its opinion reversing the trial court, the Missouri Supreme Court 
expressed serious doubts about the confession’s trustworthiness.29 It 
noted that Hector had probably confessed “to gain a respite from 
pain.”30 The court also noted that the confession had not been corrobo-
rated by other evidence.31 It is unclear, however, whether the court would 
still have excluded the confession if Hector had been able to locate the 
money.32 This opinion highlights the link between the confession’s un-
trustworthiness and its inadmissibility by emphasizing that Hector’s con-
fession was not reliable and was “most probably” made solely to stop the 
beating.33 Nevertheless, it also shows the danger of making the admissi-
                                                                                                                      
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
22 See Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 166, 168 (1829). 
23 See id. at 167. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
27 See Hector, 2 Mo. at 167. 
28 See id. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. (noting the confession’s untrustworthiness “was strengthened by the fact that 
no money was found where the party and prisoner went to look for it”). 
32 See Hector, 2 Mo. at 168. 
33 See id. Similarly, in Brown v. Mississippi, the defendant, who had already been ar-
rested and tortured once, was arrested a few days later and again “severely whipped.” 297 
U.S. 278, 281–82 (1936). The deputy told the defendant that “he would continue the 
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bility of a confession obtained by improper interrogation techniques 
hinge on its trustworthiness.34 For example, if Hector had guessed the 
location of the money correctly or if his interrogators had suggested the 
correct location, the court may have found his confession trustworthy 
and admitted it even though it was obtained through inappropriate 
methods. 
 Today, about 180 years after Hector, the debate continues over 
whether a confession’s admissibility should be determined based on its 
trustworthiness.35 In the United States, for example, many have argued 
that terrorists should not be tortured because the information obtained 
is unreliable.36 This argument was recently invoked by Senator John 
McCain, who pointed out that “in [his] experience, abuse of prisoners 
often produces bad intelligence because under torture a person will say 
anything he thinks his captors want to hear.”37 The similarities between 
McCain’s statements and the ones proffered by the court in Hector are 
striking and illustrate that the trustworthiness of the information ob-
tained by torture is still a tempting way to determine the admissibility of 
a confession.38 
 Excluding confessions primarily on “reliability” grounds is prob-
lematic because the state could devise methods of torture which pro-
duce trustworthy statements.39 Were the Nemo tenetur principle justified 
                                                                                                                      
whipping until he confessed.” Id. At that time, the defendant “agreed to confess to such a 
statement as the deputy would dictate.” Id. 
34 See Hector, 2 Mo. at 167–68. 
35 See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 377 (1964) (holding that “a defendant in a 
criminal case is deprived of due process of law if his or her conviction is founded, in whole 
or in part, upon an involuntary confession, without regard for the truth or falsity of the 
confession”) (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543–44 (1961)); see also Gisli H. 
Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Interrogations, Confessions, and Testimony 228 
(2003) (discussing voluntary false confessions); George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional Confes-
sion Law: The 1986 and 1987 Supreme Court Terms, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 231, 273–76 (1988) (dis-
cussing various reliability arguments); White, supra note 8, at 117 (discussing why some 
find reliability concerns no longer relevant). 
36 See, e.g., John McCain, Torture’s Terrible Toll, Newsweek, Nov. 21, 2005, at 34. 
37 See id. 
38 See Wigmore, supra note 11, § 824. As early as 1904, Wigmore suggested that the test 
for determining the admissibility of confessions obtained as a result of questionable police 
tactics should be whether the police conduct was “such that there was any fair risk of a false 
confession.” Id. Wigmore’s test asks whether the interrogation employed by the police was 
of such a nature that it created a fair risk of a false confession regardless of whether it is 
proven that the content of the confession was true. Id. Some scholars still defend reliability 
tests for determining the admissibility of a confession similar to the one advocated by 
Wigmore more than a century ago. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 11, at 1294–95. 
39 See Thomas, supra note 11, at 1293–96. A recent report suggests that torture might 
lead to reliable information. See Scott Shane, Inside a 9/11 Mastermind’s Interrogation, N.Y. 
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primarily as a protection against untrustworthy statements, then the 
admissibility of a confession would depend primarily on its trustworthi-
ness. The danger of this “reliability” argument, therefore, is that it opens 
the door to the legalization of torture if the information obtained is 
trustworthy.40 To remain respectful of human dignity, it would seem that 
such statements should not be admitted into evidence regardless of 
their reliability. 
 Therefore, the primary justification of this principle should not be 
that it is a safeguard against untrustworthy statements.41 Although un-
trustworthy statements will sometimes be barred by the Nemo tenetur prin-
ciple, the primary justification should be broader so as to exclude state-
ments obtained through improper methods of interrogation in spite of 
their trustworthiness.42 
B. The Limits of Trustworthiness in the Confession Context 
 The United States Supreme Court has said that the right against 
self-incrimination—which derives from the Nemo tenetur principle— 
should not be justified primarily as a protection against untrustworthy 
confessions.43 In Spano v. New York, the Supreme Court examined the 
link between a statement’s trustworthiness and its admissibility under 
the Due Process Clause guarantee against coerced confessions.44 In that 
case, the issue was the admissibility of a confession obtained after inter-
rogating the suspect from approximately 7:00 p.m. until 4:00 a.m.45 The 
evidence presented at trial revealed no serious doubts about the truth-
                                                                                                                      
Times, June 22, 2008, at A1 (explaining how after being tortured, Khalid Sheikh Moham-
med became “quite compliant” and produced useful intelligence). But see Mark Bowden, 
The Ploy, Atlantic, May 2007, at 54 (describing how interrogators, without torture, were 
able to produce reliable intelligence from people from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s inner cir-
cle that led to his eventual killing). Wigmore’s “reliability” tests would not bar the admissi-
bility of incriminating statements obtained through torture as long as the government 
could prove that method of torture predictably and reliably produced useful intelligence. 
See Wigmore, supra note 11, § 824. 
40 See Wigmore, supra note 11, § 824; Charles T. McCormick, Some Problems and Devel-
opments in the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 Tex. L. Rev. 239, 245 (1946) (“[T]he predomi-
nate motive of the courts has been that of protecting the citizen against violation of his 
privileges of immunity from bodily manhandling by the police, and from other undue 
pressures . . . of the ‘third degree.’”); Thomas, supra note 11, at 1293–94; White, supra note 
8, at 138. 
41 See Wigmore, supra note 11, § 824; McCormick, supra note 40, at 245; White, supra 
note 8, at 138. 
42 See infra Part III for further discussion. 
43 See Spano, 360 U.S. at 320–21; Godsey, supra note 1, at 480. 
44 See Spano, 360 U.S. at 320–21. 
45 See id. at 317, 319, 322. 
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fulness of the confession and, consequently, the guilt of the defendant.46 
Rather, the Court ruled that the confession was inadmissible because it 
had been obtained in violation of the suspect’s right to not be coerced 
into self-incrimination.47 The Supreme Court did not ground its exclu-
sion of the confession in the confession’s trustworthiness. Chief Justice 
Warren justified the Court’s holding by pointing out that: 
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confes-
sions does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthi-
ness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police 
must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life 
and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods 
used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the ac-
tual criminals themselves.48 
 This opinion suggests that justifying the exclusion of a statement 
obtained by improper interrogation techniques solely on the grounds 
that the statement is not trustworthy may inadvertently justify the ad-
mission of truthful statements obtained through torture. For example, 
in Spano, independent evidence showed the confession was most likely 
truthful.49 Therefore, if the statement’s admissibility was determined 
mainly by its trustworthiness, the confession obtained after eight 
straight hours of interrogation may have been admitted.50 
 The Court, however, largely ignored the reliability of the confes-
sion.51 Instead, it focused on factors that had little to do with the con-
fession’s trustworthiness.52 For example, it noted that the suspect was a 
poorly educated foreigner with a history of emotional instability.53 It 
also noted that one police officer who participated in the interrogation 
was a good friend of the suspect.54 This officer told the suspect that the 
officer would lose his job if the suspect refused to confess.55 
 This decision illustrates how even a trustworthy confession may still 
violate the Nemo tenetur principle.56 Indeed, the Supreme Court, since 
                                                                                                                      
46 See id at 324. 
47 See id. at 320–21, 324. 
48 Id. at 320–21. 
49 See Spano, 360 U.S. at 324. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. at 320–21, 324. 
52 See id. at 320–21. 
53 Id. at 321–22. 
54 Spano, 360 U.S. at 323. 
55 Id. The Court also based its holding on the interrogation’s duration. See id. 
56 See id. at 320–21; see also White, supra note 8, at 112–13. 
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Spano, has explicitly stated that some confessions are inadmissible even 
if they are trustworthy, because “certain interrogation techniques . . . are 
so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”57 More-
over, the Court has stated that “the aim [of the right against self-
incrimination] is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to 
prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or 
false.”58 
II. The Nemo Tenetur Principle and the Voluntariness  
of the Confession 
 It has been suggested that the Nemo tenetur principle protects 
against “involuntary” confessions.59 This view is grounded on the no-
tion that the right to be free from coercive interrogation stems from 
respect for the suspect’s autonomy.60 This justification of the Nemo tene-
tur principle has been influential both in civil law and common law 
countries.61 In Spain, for example, it has been stated that the exercise 
of the right against self-incrimination, which derives from the Nemo tene-
tur principle, seeks to ensure “the . . . freedom and spontaneity” of the 
suspect.62 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has pointed out 
that the right against self-incrimination is intended to protect the 
“mental freedom” of the subject.63 
                                                                                                                      
57 See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985) (reviewing whether voluntariness of a 
confession is an issue of fact). 
58 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (quoting Lisbena v. California, 314 
U.S. 219, 290 (1941) (holding that there must be coercive police activity to determine a 
confession involuntary under the Due Process Clause)). 
59 See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433–34 (2000) (summarizing the 
role of the voluntariness test in confession jurisprudence through the past century); Ari-
zona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285–86 (1991) (“[A] ‘determination regarding the vol-
untariness of a confession . . . must be viewed in a totality of the circumstances.’”) (quoting 
State v. Fulminante, 778 P.2d 602, 608 (Ariz. 1988)); Imwinkelried et al., supra note 6, 
§ 2303 (“To successfully offer an admission or confession into evidence, the prosecutor 
must comply with [the voluntariness doctrine] . . . . The voluntariness doctrine requires 
that admissions and confessions be shown to have been made voluntarily.”); Lafave et al., 
supra note 6, § 6.2(b) (“This due process test is customarily referred to as the ‘voluntari-
ness’ requirement, the term used by the Court in enunciating the due process requisites 
for admissibility.”). 
60 See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 285–88. 
61 See id.; Alberto Montón Redondo et al., Derecho Jurisdiccional III Proceso 
Penal 199 (Bosch 1995) (author trans.). 
62 See Redondo, supra note 61, at 199. 
63 Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 602 (1944) (examining why coercion of a confes-
sion violates principles of liberty and justice). 
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 At first glance, justifying the Nemo tenetur principle as a protection 
of a suspect’s autonomy does not seem objectionable. After all, the 
Fifth Amendment bars the government from compelling individuals to 
incriminate themselves.64 In fact, justifying the principle as a protection 
of the suspect’s freedom is more defensible than justifying it as a pro-
tection against untrustworthy confessions. Nevertheless the voluntary 
or involuntary nature of the statement should not be the primary fac-
tor in determining whether it was obtained in violation of the Nemo tene-
tur principle.65 
 Conceiving the Nemo tenetur principle as a vehicle for guaranteeing 
voluntary confessions presents three different problems. First, suspects 
in almost every legal system can be lawfully compelled to confess in a 
way that may diminish the voluntariness of the confession. Second, the 
definition of voluntariness depends on normative criteria. Third, recent 
scientific research has challenged whether any act is voluntary. As a re-
sult, the Nemo tenetur principle should not be justified primarily as pro-
tection of a suspect’s autonomy. 
A. Voluntariness in Domestic and Comparative Perspectives: The Problem of 
Immunity, Efficient Collaboration, and Punishment Mitigation  
in Exchange for a Confession 
 The first reason voluntariness should not be considered the pri-
mary justification of the Nemo tenetur principle is because suspects in al-
most every legal system can be compelled to confess in a way that calls 
into question the voluntariness of the confession. For example, for over 
110 years, the Supreme Court has recognized that a suspect who re-
ceives immunity can be held in contempt for refusing to testify against 
himself.66 The justification for this practice is that a grant of immunity 
                                                                                                                      
64 See U.S. Const. amend. V. 
65 See Yale Kamisar, What Is an “Involuntary” Confession?, in Police Interrogation 
and Confessions: Essays in Law and Policy 25 (1980) (suggesting that courts should 
“scrap the ‘voluntariness’ terminology altogether”); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, Free 
Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 Va. L. Rev. 859, 863 (1979) (documenting the “intoler-
able uncertainty . . . of the due process voluntariness doctrine”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
Confessions and the Court, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 865, 869–72 (1981) (reviewing Kamisar, supra) 
(discussing the defects in the due process involuntary confession rule); George C. Thomas 
III & Marshall D. Bilder, Aristotle’s Paradox and the Self-Incrimination Puzzle, 82 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 243, 245 n.14 (1991) (citing numerous sources that discuss the problems 
with the involuntary confession rule). 
66 See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 609–10 (1896) (holding that a witness with im-
munity was required to testify regarding his knowledge of an alleged offense and could not 
refuse on the grounds that doing so would result in self-incrimination); see also Kastigar v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). In Kastigar, the Supreme Court decided that a 
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leaves a suspect in the same position as if he had invoked his right 
against self-incrimination because his statements cannot be used against 
him in a criminal proceeding.67 
 A statement made under threat of conviction for contempt, how-
ever, is not entirely voluntary.68 Consequently, the Fifth Amendment 
protection against self-incrimination cannot be dependent on the sus-
pect’s freedom or spontaneity. If it were, then this practice of offering 
immunity in exchange for testimony would violate that right.69 
 The Rome Statute—ratified by the majority of countries in the 
world—also allows the use of immunity as a tool to compel a witness to 
testify.70 Yet, compelling a suspect to testify by giving him immunity is 
often frowned upon in civil law countries.71 Nevertheless, many coun-
tries allow the prosecution to offer a reduction in punishment for a sus-
pect’s “efficient collaboration” with governmental authorities.72 In these 
cases, the government does not entirely compel self-incrimination.73 A 
                                                                                                                      
person can be forced to testify if the State guarantees it will not use the self-incriminating 
statements or any evidence derived from those statements in a prosecution against the 
declarant. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453. This type of immunity is known as “immunity from 
use.” See Ambos, supra note 3, at 164. Another type of immunity is “transactional immu-
nity,” which is immunity from criminal liability for any transaction, matter, or thing dis-
cussed in compelled testimony. See id. “Immunity from use” grants less protection than 
“transactional immunity,” because it may allow the use of incriminating statements in a 
prosecution if there is independent incriminating evidence that is untainted by the sus-
pect’s compelled statements. See id. 
67 See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453; Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 436 (1956) 
(holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination only protects a 
witness from being compelled to give testimony that would result in criminal prosecution 
and therefore could not be invoked where the Immunity Act had removed the threat of 
prosecution for actions revealed by the compelled testimony). 
68 See Ambos, supra note 3, at 172–74. 
69 See generally Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453. 
70 See International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 74, Sept. 10, 
2002, ICC-ASP/1/3 (Part II-A). Despite the fact that the international community en-
dorsed this rule, Professor Kai Ambos has suggested that granting immunity as a means to 
force a witness to testify is incompatible with the Nemo tenetur principle. See Ambos, supra 
note 3, at 172–77. Rule 74(3) conflicts with the Nemo tenetur principle only if the principle 
is justified primarily as a protection against the admission of involuntary statements. See id. 
at 177. However, the Nemo tenetur principle should not be considered a means to ensure a 
voluntary confession. Rather, it should be conceived as a right to prevent the state from 
obtaining a confession by using inappropriate or abusive interrogation methods. See infra 
Part III. 
71 See Ambos, supra note 3, at 166; Quispe Farfán & Fany Soledad, Derecho a la No In-
criminación y su Aplicación en el Perú § 3.6, (2002) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, Universi-
dad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos) (author trans.). 
72 See Farfán & Soledad, supra note 71, § 3.6. Colombia and Peru, among others, allow 
granting benefits in exchange for efficient collaboration. Id. 
73 Id. 
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reduction in punishment, however, may increase the likelihood that the 
suspect will “waive” the rights afforded by the Nemo tenetur principle, 
thereby lessening the voluntariness of his confession.74 
 Not all civil law countries regulate the legal effect of efficient col-
laboration.75 Most allow, however, a considerable mitigation of punish-
ment where the suspect gives a “truthful confession” of his participation 
in the crime.76 Just like statements obtained in exchange for efficient 
collaboration, it is unclear whether a decision to confess which was in-
duced by a promise of less severe punishment is really “voluntary” and 
spontaneous. Nevertheless, courts in civil law jurisdictions often allow 
this practice.77 Indeed, Spain’s Constitutional Court has even asserted 
that this practice is compatible with the Nemo tenetur principle.78 Because 
the “voluntary” character of this type of confession is questionable, the 
legitimacy of this practice must be based on a conception of the Nemo 
tenetur principle that is not grounded on the suspect giving the state-
ment voluntarily.79 
 As a result, the continental practice of granting benefits for effi-
cient collaboration, like the practice of granting immunity in exchange 
for testimony in the United States, strengthens the argument against 
voluntariness as the primary justification of the Nemo tenetur principle. 
Neither practice can be reconciled with a right against self-incrimination 
unless one adopts a conception of the Nemo tenetur principle that is di-
vorced from the voluntariness of the confession.80 
                                                                                                                      
74 Id. 
75 See Stephen C. Thaman, Plea-Bargaining, Negotiating Confession and Consensual Resolu-
tion of Criminal Cases, 11 Electronic J. Comp. L., Dec. 2007, at 1, 1–10, available at http:// 
www.ejcl.org/113/article113-34.pdf. 
76 See, e.g., id. at 20–21. This is the case, for example, in Argentina, Spain, Italy, and 
Germany. See id. at 38, 41; Farfán & Soledad, supra note 71, § 3.6. 
77 See Farfán & Soledad, supra note 71, § 3.6. 
78 See STC, May 25, 1987 (R.J., No. 75) (author trans.) (holding that the offer of sen-
tence-mitigation in exchange for a suspect’s confession does not deprive a suspect of the 
fundamental right not to confess involuntarily). 
79 See Farfán & Soledad, supra note 71, § 3.6. See generally Godsey, supra note 1, at 473 
(discussing the departure in U.S. case law from “the involuntary confession rule”). 
80 Compare Farfán & Soledad, supra note 71, § 3.6 (noting that a reduction in punish-
ment may cause a suspect to “waive” the rights afforded by the Nemo tenetur principle, 
thereby lessening the voluntariness of his confession), with Godsey, supra note 1, at 473 
(arguing that confessions should be inadmissible where they are compelled by imposing 
objective penalties on a suspect in order to punish silence and provoke speech). 
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B. The Difficulty of Identifying the Voluntariness of a Statement Without 
Appealing to Normative Criteria 
 The second reason voluntariness should not be the primary justifi-
cation for Nemo tenetur is that the definition of voluntary depends heav-
ily on normative criteria.81 In the third book of Nichomachean Ethics, Ar-
istotle contends that an act must be considered voluntary if it is caused 
by an agent’s desire.82 Aristotle suggests that a person acts voluntarily if 
he agrees to commit a crime to spare the lives of his family because he 
has the option of committing or not committing the offense.83 Ulti-
mately, Aristotle argues, the cause of his act is not the coercion under 
which he is placed, but his desire to save his family.84 
 The Aristotelian definition of voluntariness is at the core of crimi-
nal theory.85 Indeed, the Aristotelian concept of voluntariness can be 
useful in some contexts.86 Nevertheless, it is broader than the notion of 
“voluntariness” as it is used by courts and commentators when analyz-
ing the Nemo tenetur principle.87 For example, an incriminating state-
ment made under torture is voluntary in the Aristotelian sense because 
the decision to incriminate oneself falls ultimately on the suspect.88 
Such a confession, however, would not be considered voluntary under 
the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence today.89 
 The concept of voluntariness used in the court’s current jurispru-
dence is more similar to the analysis under the affirmative defense of 
duress.90 Under that defense, an act carried out under coercion is gen-
                                                                                                                      
81 See Godsey, supra note 1, at 468–69. 
82 See Aristotle, The Nichomachean Ethics 55–56 ( J.A.K. Thomson trans., Penguin 
Books 2004). 
83 See id. at 50. 
84 See id. 
85 See Joseph D. Grano, Confessions, Truth, and the Law 61 (1993) (stating that 
the “effort to distinguish voluntary from involuntary actions dates back at least to Aris-
totle”). 
86 See id. at 61–62. 
87 See, e.g., Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433–34; Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 285–86; Grano, supra 
note 85, at 61–62 (“[F]or purposes of assessing blame and praise, we would find our stan-
dards . . . intolerably severe were voluntariness under Aristotle’s definition the only rele-
vant consideration.”). 
88 See Aristotle, supra note 82, at 50. 
89 Compare id., with Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433–34 (summarizing the role of voluntariness 
test in confession jurisprudence through the past century), and Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 
285–86 (credible threat of violence resulted in a coerced confession in violation of defen-
dant’s due process rights), and Grano, supra note 65, at 863 (documenting the “intolerable 
uncertainty . . . of the due process voluntariness doctrine”). 
90 See Model Penal Code § 2.09 (1985) (prescribing the affirmative defense of duress 
only where the actor “engaged in criminal conduct because he was coerced to do so by the 
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erally considered to be voluntary.91 However, if the defendant is able to 
prove that his decision to succumb to the coercion was reasonable, he 
will not be punished for that coerced wrongful act.92 This defense is 
justified not because such acts are involuntary, but rather because soci-
ety cannot fairly expect coerced actors to abstain from engaging in the 
illegal act when a person of reasonable firmness would have done the 
same.93 The defendant’s decision to succumb is analyzed under the 
“person of reasonable firmness” test.94 Under this test, a court exam-
ines whether a person of reasonable firmness in a similar situation with 
similar pressure would have abstained from engaging in a wrongful 
act.95 If the court concludes that a person of reasonable firmness would 
have resisted the pressure, then the defense does not apply.96 
 A more accurate definition of voluntary under the Nemo tenetur 
principle would employ the same type of analysis. It would recognize 
that threats of torture or other types of coercion, while not completely 
obliterating the will, substantially reduce the subject’s ability to choose 
freely whether to confess or not.97 The subject still has a choice (to con-
fess or to be tortured), but these remaining options are not particularly 
attractive. 
 This definition of voluntary, however, raises two questions. First, 
how much must the suspect’s ability to choose be reduced so that his 
act should be considered involuntary? Second, when are the remaining 
courses of action so unattractive that the suspect’s decision to confess 
should be considered involuntary? 
 Suppose a suspect has asserted his Fifth Amendment right not to 
incriminate himself. The police, reasoning that continued interroga-
                                                                                                                      
use or threat of unlawful force against himself or another, that a person of reasonable 
firmness would have been unable to resist”). 
91 See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.01 (1985) (prescribing that only unconscious body 
movements or body movements that are the product of a reflex, convulsion, or hypnosis 
ought to be considered “involuntary” for the purposes of criminal law). The Code suggests 
acts committed under duress or coercion are voluntary. See id. Therefore, duress or coer-
cion is only a defense to a crime if the defendant’s decision to succumb to the coercion is 
reasonable. Id. § 2.09. 
92 See id. § 2.09. 
93 See id. 
94 See id. 
95 Id.; see also Luis E. Chiesa, Duress, Demanding Heroism, and Proportionality, 41 Vand. J. 
Transnat’l L. 741, 753 (2008) (“Usually it would be unfair to punish someone for suc-
cumbing to a threat that a normal law-abiding citizen would have been unable to resist.”); 
Dressler, supra note 15, at 1385 (explaining that if a “person of reasonable moral strength 
cannot fairly be expected to resist the threat,” then the actor has a valid excuse). 
96 See Dressler, supra note 15, at 1385. 
97 See Grano, supra note 66, at 874–75. 
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tion will be useless, tell the suspect that he must return to his cell. The 
suspect, however, is terrified of his cramped and smelly cell and decides 
to incriminate himself rather than return. Alternatively, suppose the 
police, instead of merely ordering the suspect back to his cell, threaten 
to torture him if he does not confess. 
 Should the suspect’s confession in either scenario be considered 
voluntary? Was his choice so undermined by the fear of returning to his 
cell or his fear of being tortured that his confession should be consid-
ered involuntary? Can his confession be considered voluntary when his 
options (incriminating himself, being tortured, or returning to his cell) 
are unattractive? 
 To determine if the suspect’s ability to choose has been sufficiently 
reduced so as to render his act involuntary, one must compare his con-
duct with the conduct that a person of reasonable firmness would ob-
serve in his situation.98 Most people believe that confessions obtained 
by torture are involuntary because a person of reasonable firmness 
would confess under such treatment.99 In the second scenario, where 
the police threaten to torture the suspect, the suspect’s ability to act 
freely has been reduced to the point where his statement must be con-
sidered involuntary.100 A person of reasonable firmness would confess 
in order to avoid being tortured.101 A similar analysis could be used to 
determine if the suspect’s options were so unattractive that it must be 
concluded that his choice was involuntary. Given that a person of rea-
sonable firmness would not consider confessing to a crime or submit-
ting to torture to be attractive options, the decision to confess under 
these circumstances must be considered involuntary.102 
 In this way, the “person of reasonable firmness” standard is emi-
nently normative in nature.103 The “voluntariness” of the act is not de-
termined by the mental pressure experienced by the suspect.104 Rather 
the “voluntariness” of the act is determined by examining whether the 
subject’s choice-making capabilities were reduced in an unfair man-
                                                                                                                      
98 See Model Penal Code § 2.09; Chiesa, supra note 95, at 761–62; Dressler, supra note 
15, at 1367–68. 
99 See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.09; Chiesa, supra note 95, at 761–62; Dressler, supra 
note 15, at 1367–68. 
100 See Chiesa, supra note 95, at 758. 
101 See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.09; Chiesa, supra note 95, at 761–62; Dressler, supra 
note 15, at 1367–68. 
102 See Model Penal Code § 2.09; Chiesa, supra note 95, at 761–62; Dressler, supra note 
15, at 1367–68. 
103 See Schulhofer, supra note 65, at 874 n.41. 
104 See id. 
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ner.105 In the first scenario, where the police merely order the suspect 
to return to his cell, the suspect’s confession should be considered vol-
untary. It should be admissible even if it is demonstrated that he felt 
compelled to confess because of the mental pressure of returning to his 
cell. To reject the statement simply because of the suspect’s perceived 
mental pressure would lead to an overly subjective analysis. Confessions 
made by a suspect must be considered involuntary and consequently 
inadmissible only if the officers compromised the suspect’s voluntari-
ness by using inappropriate methods as they did in the second sce-
nario.106 
 As the above scenarios show, the Nemo tenetur principle should not 
be primarily justified as a protection of a suspect’s “freedom” and 
“spontaneity.” Rather, the admissibility of confessions should be deter-
mined by examining whether the government unfairly constrained the 
suspect’s decision to confess rather than by inquiring into whether the 
suspect freely chose to incriminate himself. 
C. Voluntariness and Neuroscience 
 The third reason voluntariness should not be the primary justifica-
tion for the Nemo tenetur principle is because recent developments in 
neuroscience suggest that human behavior is most likely determined 
almost entirely by factors outside an individual’s control.107 These dis-
coveries further undermine the argument that the Nemo tenetur princi-
ple should be justified primarily as a protection of a suspect’s autonomy. 
 Forty years ago, the neurophysicist Benjamin Libet made an ex-
traordinary discovery.108 According to his research, the brain uncon-
sciously makes the decision to act almost half a second before a person 
is aware of his desire or intent to carry out the act.109 These findings 
have been corroborated many times, most recently in 2008.110 The im-
                                                                                                                      
105 See generally Alan Wertheimer, Coercion 228–30, 307–10 (1987) (defending a 
normative account of voluntariness and coercion). 
106 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986); infra Part III. 
107 Benjamin Libet et al., Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral 
Activity (Readiness Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act, 106 Brain 
623, 623–42 (1983). 
108 See id. 
109 See id. 
110 See Laurence R. Tancredi, Hardwired Behavior: What Neuroscience Reveals 
About Morality 71 (2005); Chun Siong Soon et al., Unconscious Determinants of Free Deci-
sions in the Human Brain, 11 Nature Neuroscience 543, 543–45 (May 2008). Using func-
tional MRI technology, Siong Soon and his colleagues were able to successfully predict the 
bodily movements of their human subjects up to seven seconds before they were aware of 
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plications of Libet’s experiments are monumental.111 If the intent to 
move our body develops after the brain has unconsciously made the 
decision to move it, it would appear that we do not have the ability to 
control our acts.112 These findings suggest that while we may think we 
consciously control our acts, in reality, our conduct is predetermined by 
unconscious processes.113 
 According to some neuroscientists, this evidence suggests that our 
free will “is an illusion.”114 Others have even suggested that the con-
scious will is nothing more than a mood, like happiness or sadness.115 
If, according to the results of these experiments, the brain is faster than 
conscious thought, “[i]t seems that it is not our conscious mind that 
makes the decision, but instead the sub-conscious mind.”116  Philoso-
pher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas explained the impact that neu-
roscience has had and will continue to have over the debate about free 
will in the following manner: 
[Many] neuroscientists take the position that all mental acts 
and experiences are not merely instantiated by brain proc-
esses but rather are causally determined by brain states alone. 
If neurological research today already holds the key, as is 
claimed, to soon explaining any given motivation or delibera-
tion exclusively on the basis of the nomologically determined 
interaction of neuronal processes, then we would have to view 
free will as a fiction. For, from this perspective, we must no 
longer presuppose that we could have acted differently, nor 
that it was up to us to act one way rather than another. In-
deed, within neurological descriptions, the reference to “us,” 
as agents, no longer makes any sense. Human behavior is then 
no longer decided by persons but rather fixed by their brains: 
                                                                                                                      
making the decision to move their bodies. See Brandon Keim, Brain Scanners Can See Your 
Decisions Before You Make Them, Wired, Apr. 13, 2008, http://www.wired.com/science/dis- 
coveries/news/2008/04/mind_decision. 
111 See Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to Re-
sponsibility from Neuroscience, 9 Minn. J. L. Sci. & Tech. 1, 28–29 (2008). 
112 See id. at 29. 
113 See Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Ethical Brain 92–93 (2005); Morse, supra note 
111, at 29. 
114 Gazzaniga, supra note 113, at 92–93. Renowned social psychologist Daniel Wegner 
has reached a similar conclusion. See generally Daniel M. Wegner, The Illusion of Con-
scious Will 1–28 (2002) (discussing that the idea that we “consciously will our voluntary 
actions” is merely an illusion). 
115 Wegner, supra note 114, at 325–28. 
116 Derek Sankey, Education Policy, Research and Neuroscience: The Final Solution?, 33 Aus-
tralian J. Tchr. Educ., June 2008, at 31, 40. 
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“Who or what is this ‘we’ that inhabits the brain? It is a com-
mentator and interpreter with limited access to the actual ma-
chinery, more along the lines of a press secretary than a 
president or boss.”117 
 Some have interpreted Libet’s findings to be compatible with the 
idea of free will.118 However, “nothing in the brain sciences would lead 
an independent observer to conclude that we must be libertarian 
agents.”119 Even those who assert that human beings have the ability to 
act voluntarily acknowledge that “there are at present no accepted sci-
entific models” that indicate that our acts can be consciously con-
trolled.120 They also acknowledge that there is currently no empirical 
evidence to suggest that our behavior is significantly determined by fac-
tors we can control.121 Perhaps even more compelling are the numer-
ous studies showing that significant aspects of our behavior are deter-
                                                                                                                      
117 Jürgen Habermas, The Language Game of Responsible Agency and the Problem of Free Will: 
How Can Epistemic Dualism Be Reconciled with Ontological Monism?, 10 Phil. Explorations 13, 
20 ( Joel Anderson trans., 2007) (quoting Daniel C. Dennett, Freedom Evolves 244 
(2003)). 
118 See, e.g., Dennett, supra note 117, at 227–42. Dennett, however, defends an “evolu-
tionary” notion of free will that is very different from what is commonly understood by the 
concept. Id. at 263. On the other hand, Libet has suggested that his findings can be com-
patible with the fact that human beings are able to avoid doing the act that the brain un-
consciously determined should be done. See Benjamin Libet, Do We Have Free Will?, 6 J. 
Consciousness Stud., No. 8–9 (1999), at 47, 51–53. In Libet’s own words: 
The initiation of the freely voluntary act appears to begin in the brain uncon-
sciously, well before the person consciously knows he wants to act! Is there, 
then, any role for conscious will in the performance of a voluntary act? To an-
swer this it must be recognized that conscious will [to act] . . . does appear 
about 150 msec. before the muscle is activated, even though [the brain un-
consciously ordered the muscle activation several hundred milliseconds be-
fore the subject became aware of it]. An interval of 150 msec. would allow 
enough time in which the [subject’s] conscious function might affect the fi-
nal outcome of the volitional process. 
Id. at 51 (citation omitted). These statements suggest that it is possible that human beings 
might be able to willingly avoid doing something, but not to decide positively to do some-
thing. See id. at 51–53. Thus, it may be contended that human beings have “free won’t” 
instead of “free will.” See id. 
119 Manuel Vargas, Response to Kane, Fischer, and Pereboom, in Four Views on Free Will 
204, 206 (2007). 
120 See, e.g., Robert Kane, Response to Fischer, Pereboom, and Vargas, in Four Views on 
Free Will, supra note 119, at 166, 181 (quoting Manuel Vargas, Revisionism, in Four Views 
on Free Will, supra note 119, at 126, 143). 
121 Id. 
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mined by genetic and environmental factors outside of our control.122 
The results of this research “[are] forcing us to rethink the extent of 
our personal control over our choices.”123 
 This evidence, which suggests that our acts are not determined by 
our conscious will, threatens to undermine any argument which seeks 
to justify the Nemo tenetur principle primarily as a protection of a sus-
pect’s autonomy.124 After all, why should we believe that such a funda-
mental right exists to protect a mental faculty whose existence is de-
bated?125 Because considerable evidence shows we may not be able to 
control our acts (including illocutionary acts), we should justify the 
Nemo tenetur principle by appealing to considerations that go beyond 
the “voluntariness” or “involuntariness” of the statement.126 
III. Beyond Trustworthiness and Voluntariness 
 Parts I and II argued that it is undesirable to conceive the Nemo tene-
tur principle as a guarantee against untrustworthy or involuntary state-
ments. Consequently, the principle should be justified primarily as a 
safeguard against the use of inappropriate interrogation techniques.127 
Justifying the Nemo tenetur principle primarily as a protection against in-
appropriate interrogation techniques, however, does not mean that the 
trustworthiness or voluntariness of a statement will not be taken into 
account. 
 Sometimes an untrustworthy confession is inadmissible pursuant 
to the Nemo tenetur principle.128 An untrustworthy confession, however, 
can be obtained in a manner compatible with the Nemo tenetur princi-
ple.129 Conversely, a trustworthy statement can be obtained through 
coercion or torture, and thus be incompatible with the suspect’s right 
to be free from coerced interrogation.130 
                                                                                                                      
122 See Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate, 41 Div. One Gen. Psychologist, Spring 2006, at 
1, 3–4 (2006) (discussing various studies on the way in which genetics and the environ-
ment affect our behavior). 
123 Tancredi, supra note 110, at 75. 
124 See id. at 75–76. 
125 See Gazzaniga, supra note 113, at 95, 100–01. 
126 See, e.g., id.; Wegner, supra note 114, at 26–27; Soon et al., supra note 110, at 545. 
127 See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 843 n.33 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Traynor, supra note 7, at 478); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1963). 
128 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936); Hector v. State, 2 Mo. 167, 168 
(1829). 
129 See, e.g., Gudjonsson, supra note 36, at 227–29 (discussing voluntary false confes-
sions). 
130 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320–21 (1959). 
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 It is also possible that a confession obtained in violation of the sus-
pect’s right not to incriminate himself was secured under circumstances 
that would make the confession involuntary.131 Confessions obtained by 
torture, for example, are usually considered to be involuntary.132 Yet, 
conceiving the Nemo tenetur principle as a vehicle for guaranteeing the 
voluntariness of a suspect’s decision to confess presents three different 
problems. First, suspects in almost every legal system can be compelled 
to confess in a way that calls into question the voluntariness of the con-
fession.133 Second, making the admissibility of a statement hinge upon 
its voluntary character is also objectionable, since the definition of vol-
untariness or involuntariness depends on normative criteria.134 Third, 
recent scientific research suggests humans do not possess the ability to 
voluntarily control their acts.135 As a result, the Nemo tenetur principle 
should be justified by considerations unrelated to the trustworthiness 
or voluntariness of the confession.136 
A. The Nemo Tenetur Principle as a Protection Against Improper Governmental 
Conduct 
 The Nemo tenetur principle should be understood as a guarantee 
against the state’s use of improper or abusive interrogation techniques. 
The right, however, cannot be invoked against private persons in the 
vast majority of jurisdictions.137 For example, the protection against self-
                                                                                                                      
131 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 n.53 (1972) (“A coerced confession 
is as revealing of leads as testimony given in exchange for immunity and indeed is ex-
cluded in part because it is compelled incrimination in violation of the privilege.”) (quot-
ing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n, 378 U.S. 52, 103 (1964) (White, J. concurring)). 
132 Gudjonsson, supra note 36, at 284. 
133 See supra notes 66–80 and accompanying text. 
134 See supra notes 81–106 and accompanying text. 
135 See, e.g., Libet et al., supra note 107, at 640; Soon et al., supra note 110, at 545. 
136 See Spano, 360 U.S. at 324 (holding that the accurate confession by the defendant 
obtained through coercion was violative of his Fourteenth Amendment rights); Dix, supra 
note 35, at 275 (stating that whether coercive techniques by police officers pose threats to 
reliability may be impossible to “address with any certainty”). 
137 See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (“[C]oercive police activity 
is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning 
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Wigfall v. State, 710 So. 2d 
931, 937 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997) (“So long as law enforcement officers do not incite or 
coach family members to elicit a confession from the accused, the fact that a defendant 
elects to confess after conferring with family members does not render a confession invol-
untary.”); Mirabal v. State, 698 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that an 
involuntary confession to private employers cannot taint a second confession to police 
after defendant waived his rights); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 899 S.W.2d 75, 75–76 (Ky. 
1995) (holding that coercive conduct by a private citizen does not render a confession 
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incrimination does not require that our friends advise us of our right to 
remain silent before asking potentially incriminating questions.138 
Therefore, if someone answers incriminating questions posed by a pri-
vate person, the statements are admissible against him, regardless of 
how those answers were obtained.139 Conversely, if the police torture a 
suspect to obtain a confession, that confession should be deemed in-
admissible.140 The crucial factor that differentiates these two cases is 
not the relative voluntariness or trustworthiness of the statements, but 
the presence or absence of inappropriate police conduct.141 
B. Identifying Improper Methods of Interrogation 
 Once the Nemo tenetur principle is conceived as a protection against 
the use of unacceptable methods of interrogation to obtain incriminat-
ing statements, it becomes necessary to provide a framework that helps 
us to identify improper or abusive interrogation techniques. Such a 
framework is necessary to provide a concrete conceptual structure that 
                                                                                                                      
involuntary and therefore inadmissible under state law); Hough v. State, 929 S.W.2d 484 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a confession was voluntary, despite the defendant’s 
estranged wife telling him that she would reconcile with him). But see State v. Bowe, 881 
P.2d 538, 546 (Haw. 1994) (“[A]n individual’s capacity to make a rational and free choice 
between confessing and remaining silent may be overborne as much by the coercive con-
duct of a private individual as by the coercive conduct of the police. . . . Therefore . . . ad-
mitting coerced confessions regardless of the source of the coercion, is fundamentally 
unfair.”); State v. Martin, 645 So. 2d 752, 754 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (“[T]his state statute 
mandates that all confessions, regardless of whether a state actor was involved, must be 
voluntary.”); Commonwealth v. Brandwein, 760 N.E.2d 724, 732 n.10 (Mass. 2002) 
(“[C]oercion by a private party may render a defendant’s confession to that private party 
involuntary, requiring that the confession be suppressed as violative of due process.”); 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 686 N.E.2d 983, 989 (Mass. 1997) (holding that, in a murder 
prosecution, the defendant’s confessions made to his sister and brother were admissible, 
where the “judge correctly instructed [the] jury to disregard statements to family members 
unless they concluded for themselves that the Commonwealth had proved beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the statements were voluntary”); People v. Sorbo, 649 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319 
(Sup. Ct. 1996) (“[F]ruits of statements made involuntarily to private parties are subject to 
suppression.”). 
138 See Wigfall, 710 So. 2d at 937 (“So long as law enforcement officers do not incite or 
coach family members to elicit a confession from the accused, the fact that a defendant 
elects to confess after conferring with family members does not render a confession invol-
untary.”). 
139 See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165. 
140 See id. at 164. 
141 See id. at 167 (holding that “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to find-
ing that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,” and hence a confession coerced by a private citizen is volun-
tary). 
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will assist judges in discriminating between acceptable and unaccept-
able methods of interrogation in borderline cases.142 
 This Part provides such a framework by arguing that the police act 
improperly when they obtain a confession by methods that involve the 
use of coercion, certain kinds of deception, exploitation or the transgression 
of a mutually agreed upon rule with the purpose of obtaining an unfair 
advantage over the suspect. 
1. Coercion 
 The government acts inappropriately if it coerces the suspect to 
confess by threatening to use physical force against him.143 This is the 
core of the Fifth Amendment’s due process protection against forced 
confessions. Coerced confessions must be considered inadmissible re-
gardless of their trustworthiness and voluntariness.144 A confession 
made under threat of torture must not be admitted as evidence even if 
there are techniques that allow the state to successfully ascertain the 
statement’s trustworthiness. By the same token, forced confessions 
should not be admitted into evidence even if the subject conclusively 
demonstrates that the police coercion did not influence his decision to 
confess.145 
 It is also inappropriate to try to compel the suspect to confess by 
threatening to cause him psychological pain.146 Examples of psycho-
                                                                                                                      
142 See Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court’s Voluntariness Doc-
trine in Historical Perspective, 67 Wash. U. L.Q. 59, 116–17 (1989). 
[Miranda’s] most serious flaw, however, lay in the fact that it was a value-laden 
method of constitutional adjudication that created vague, unpredictable stan-
dards which failed to provide clear guidance to police and made judicial review 
a morass of subjectivity. The Court itself openly complained of the difficulties in 
drawing the line between an acceptable police tactic and a violation of due 
process particularly when the Court must make “fine judgments as to the effect 
of psychologically coercive pressures and inducements on the mind and will of 
the accused.” 
Id. (quoting Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963)) (citing Schulhofer, supra 
note 65, at 869–70) (discussing difficulties for courts and police posed by due process in-
voluntary confession rule). 
143 See U.S. Const. amend. V; Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 349–50 (2006) 
(“We require exclusion of coerced confessions . . . because we disapprove of such coercion 
. . . .”); Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 347 (1981). 
144 See Wigmore, supra note 11, § 824; McCormick, supra note 40, at 268–69; White, su-
pra note 8, at 117. 
145 See Kamisar, supra note 65, at 24. 
146 See Gudjonsson, supra note 36, at 316. 
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logical pain may include a threat to take away a suspect’s custody over 
his children or his property if he fails to incriminate himself.147 
 In general, coercion occurs when the police obtain a confession by 
threatening to commit an illegal act.148 Conversely, a confession is usu-
ally admissible if the suspect is compelled to testify against himself with 
a threat by the police to commit a legal act.149 Suppose, for example, 
that a police officer asks a car driver if he has ingested alcoholic bever-
ages in the past few hours. The driver refuses to answer, and the officer 
threatens to administer an alcohol test if the driver refuses again. If it is 
legal to administer an alcohol test, it is not inappropriate for the officer 
to threaten the driver with performing the test.150 
2. Deception 
 Police can also act inappropriately by using certain kinds of decep-
tion to obtain a confession.151 Not all kinds of deception, however, are 
equally wrongful. Obtaining a confession by lying to the suspect and 
obtaining a confession by misleading the suspect are different.152 
 As a general rule, it is more blameworthy to lie than to mislead by 
asserting something that is not false.153 Federal criminal law reflects the 
different culpability of these two types of deception.154 For example, a 
witness is guilty of perjury if he lies under oath.155 Lying is defined as 
asserting something the witness believes to be false.156 A witness, how-
ever, does not commit perjury if he misleads others by asserting some-
thing true or not capable of being true or false.157 
                                                                                                                      
147 See id. 
148 See id. at 206. 
149 See id. 
150 See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562 (1983) (holding that the admission 
into evidence of the defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not offend 
his privilege against self-incrimination because no impermissible coercion is involved when 
the suspect refuses to submit to take the test, regardless of the form of refusal). 
151 See White, supra note 8, at 118–19. 
152 See Green, supra note 16, at 77–78. 
153 See id. at 78. 
154 See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006). 
155 See id. 
156 See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 357 (1973). 
157 See id. at 357–58 (stating that perjury statutes do “not [deal] with casual conversa-
tion and the [perjury] statute does not make it a criminal act for a witness to willfully state 
any material matter that implies any material matter that he does not believe to be true”). 
In sum, the Supreme Court expressly held in Bronston that the federal perjury statute pro-
hibits lying under oath, but not misleading under oath. See id. 
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 The distinction is morally relevant in non-legal contexts. In the 
most recent presidential campaign, supporters of John McCain asserted 
that Barack Obama’s middle name was “Hussein.”158 They also pointed 
out that this is a common name in the Muslim world.159 Both assertions 
are true.160 The purpose of the assertion, however, was to mislead the 
public into believing that Obama is Muslim and it is objectionable, al-
though it would be much more blameworthy to falsely assert that 
“Obama is Muslim.” The difference between lying and misleading 
should be taken into account when determining if an inappropriate 
deception was used to obtain a confession.161 Lying in order to obtain a 
statement must always be considered inappropriate.162 Nevertheless, 
misleading a suspect by asserting something that is not false is not nec-
essarily unacceptable.163 For example, a police officer acts in an unac-
ceptable manner if he tells a suspect that it is better for him to confess, 
since DNA tests reveal that he raped the victim when the officer knows 
there are no such tests.164 The officer, however, may try to induce a con-
fession through other methods. For example, he could tell the suspect 
correctly, though with the intent to mislead, that the police officer is 
about to receive a DNA test that he believes will implicate the suspect in 
a rape.165 Although the purpose of the latter assertion is to mislead the 
suspect into a belief that DNA tests will confirm his guilt, the suspect 
cannot rationally conclude this statement is true unless he also believes 
the DNA test will implicate him in the rape.166 If the suspect makes the 
wrong inference without gathering additional information to clarify the 
situation, the police officer is not entirely responsible for the suspect’s 
confession.167 If it seems reasonable that individuals should be held ac-
                                                                                                                      
158 See Foon Rhee, Biden Calls Latest Attacks on Obama Dangerous, Says McCain Campaign 
Is Inciting Anger, Boston Globe, Oct. 9, 2008, at 18. 
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160 See id. 
161 See Green, supra note 16, at 78–79. 
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164 See Green, supra note 16, at 77. 
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countable for the consequences of their bad acts, why shouldn’t they 
also be held accountable for the consequences of their bad infer-
ences?168 
3. Exploitation 
 The police also act inappropriately when they exploit a subject’s 
physical or mental condition or character traits with the aim of obtain-
ing a confession. A suspect is exploited when he is used for someone 
else’s benefit in a way that is detrimental to his own well-being.169 The 
exploitation of a person can occur in many ways. It is possible, for ex-
ample, to exploit a suspect’s weaknesses.170 It is also possible to exploit a 
suspect’s strengths.171 Sometimes what is exploited is a suspect’s particu-
lar circumstances.172 These traits or circumstances can be exploited by 
promises, flattery, or requests.173 A suspect can also be exploited by ap-
peals to his sense of friendship, compassion, or a religious, ethical, or 
legal duty.174 
 Sometimes it is not clear that the exploitation of the suspect is 
morally wrong. For example, it is not obviously unacceptable to use a 
person’s sense of friendship or compassion to get something.175 In 
some contexts, however, it may be inappropriate to exploit these feel-
ings.176 For instance, in Spano, an officer who was a good friend of the 
suspect told the suspect that he would lose his job with the police if he 
failed to secure a confession.177 The Supreme Court condemned this 
type of behavior.178 It suggested, however, that the exploitation of the 
subject’s sense of friendship and compassion did not necessarily entail 
the inadmissibility of the confession.179 Rather, it stated that the totality 
                                                                                                                      
at 132. Whereas the former conduct is clearly inappropriate, it is unclear whether the latter 
type of conduct ought to lead to the inadmissibility of the confession thus obtained. See id. 
168 See Jonathan E. Adler, Lying, Deceiving, or Falsely Implicating, 94 J. Phil. 435, 444 
(1997) (arguing that deception, rather than lies, involve the hearer’s responsibility and 
mistaken inferences). 
169 See generally 4 Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing 176–78 (1988). 
170 See id. at 181–82. 
171 See id. at 181; Vittorio Bufacchi, The Injustice of Exploitation, 5 Critical Rev. Int’l 
Soc. & Pol. Phil. 1, 2 (2002). 
172 See Green, supra note 16, at 95. 
173 See Feinberg, supra note 169, at 181. 
174 See id. 
175 See Green, supra note 16, at 96–97. 
176 See Spano, 360 U.S. at 323. 
177 See id. 
178 See id. at 323–24. 
179 See id. at 323. 
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of the circumstances surrounding the statement must be analyzed in 
order to determine if the officer’s conduct was sufficiently blameworthy 
so as to make the confession inadmissible.180 Exploiting a suspect by 
appealing to his sense of friendship and compassion is just one of the 
factors considered in the analysis.181 Ultimately, the exploitation of such 
character traits should be considered relevant but not determinative 
when examining whether the police obtained a confession in a manner 
that is incompatible with the Nemo tenetur principle.182 
 Certain types of exploitation, however, are clearly unacceptable. 
Take, for example, a shop-owner who drastically increases the price of 
basic goods after a natural disaster. The shop owner’s behavior is unac-
ceptable because he is purposely taking advantage of his customers’ 
vulnerable position. This kind of exploitation becomes even more un-
acceptable when the person who takes advantage of the situation has 
intentionally caused the other’s defenselessness.183 Interrogating a sus-
pect who is under police custody is an example of this type of exploita-
tion.184 In these situations, the government purposely reduces the sus-
pect to a state of powerlessness in order to obtain a confession by 
exploiting the suspect’s acute vulnerability.185 
 Imagine a suspect newly in police custody. At first glance, it would 
seem that a suspect in police custody has not been placed in a position 
of great helplessness. When, however, it is taken into account that the 
suspect’s basic needs and freedoms are entirely at the mercy of the po-
lice, the suspect’s profound vulnerability becomes apparent.186 The 
person in custody cannot move without police permission, and he has 
no power to interrupt the interrogation to use the bathroom, smoke a 
cigarette, or grab a bite to eat. If the interrogation room is too cold, the 
suspect can only wait for the police to decide to turn on the heat or 
give him a blanket. The police, in sum, have almost total control over 
the person in custody.187 Therefore, it seems wrong for the police to try 
to obtain a confession by exploiting the defenselessness of the sus-
pect.188 
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 The police may nevertheless remedy the situation by advising the 
suspect of his constitutional right to remain silent and, more impor-
tantly, his right to counsel during the interrogation.189 After the suspect 
has been advised that the police have to provide him with an attorney 
during the interrogation to defend him, the suspect no longer has rea-
son to believe that he is utterly defenseless.190 
4. Transgression 
 The Supreme Court has ruled that after the formal commence-
ment of criminal proceedings against a defendant, the Sixth Amend-
ment’s right to counsel bars the State from deliberately eliciting in-
criminating statements from the defendant unless his lawyer is 
present.191 The right to counsel afforded by the Sixth Amendment in 
such circumstances differs from the protections afforded to suspects 
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona because it is triggered regardless of 
whether the suspect is being subjected to custodial interrogation.192 
Therefore, it cannot be argued that the purpose of affording defen-
dants with a Sixth Amendment right to counsel during police interroga-
tions is to avoid the exploitation of the state of vulnerability caused by 
police custody. Furthermore, it cannot be maintained that the chief ob-
jective of this right is to protect the suspect against the use of coercion 
or deception.193 What, then, is the evil sought to be avoided by this safe-
guard? 
 It is submitted that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel during 
police interrogations prevents the State from transgressing a mutually 
                                                                                                                      
189 See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
190 See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Grano, supra note 88, at 145. The late Professor 
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191 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 201, 207 (1964) (holding that incriminating 
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of criminal proceedings and without the defendant’s attorney present were inadmissible). 
192 See Grano, supra note 88, at 145. 
193 See supra notes 143–174 and accompanying text. 
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agreed upon rule in order to obtain an undue advantage over the sus-
pect.194 Given the complexity of the criminal justice system, those in 
charge of litigating a criminal case are not the parties (the defendant 
and the People), but their attorneys (defense attorney and prosecutor). 
Therefore, once criminal proceedings have commenced, it is under-
stood that the State must communicate with the defendant through his 
legal representative.195 Only then can the defendant’s rights be pro-
tected, since his ignorance of the complexities of the criminal justice 
system could cause him to inadequately manage his case without the 
steady hand of his defense counsel.196 
 This mutually agreed upon rule between the suspect and the State 
is transgressed when the police interrogate the suspect without his law-
yer after the criminal process has formally begun.197 The conduct is 
inappropriate because with this transgression, the police have bypassed 
one of the foundational rules that undergird our criminal justice sys-
tem in order to obtain an undue advantage over the suspect.198 When 
this happens, the State has essentially “cheated” by violating a basic rule 
of the legal system in order to prevail over the defendant.199 
Conclusion 
 This Article began by describing three borderline cases in which it 
was not clear whether a confession had been obtained in violation of 
the Nemo tenetur principle. The case of the false confession presented a 
situation in which a suspect made a voluntary confession but where 
overwhelming evidence suggested that confession was false. In contrast, 
the confession obtained in the case of the truth serum was highly trustwor-
thy but arguably not voluntary, given that it was induced by a drug. 
Lastly, in the case of the unnecessary threat, the police physically threat-
ened the suspect if she refused to confess. The suspect, however, indi-
cated in a judicial hearing that the threat did not influence her deci-
sion to confess. 
 In order to provide solutions for these three borderline cases, this 
Article argued that the Nemo tenetur principle should be understood as a 
safeguard against the use of unacceptable methods of police interroga-
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tion. The trustworthiness or voluntariness of the statement may be im-
portant in other contexts, but they should not definitively determine 
the admissibility of a confession pursuant to the Nemo tenetur principle. 
 This conception of the Nemo tenetur principle suggests that the 
statement in the false confession case was secured in a manner that is 
compatible with the suspect’s constitutional rights and thus would be 
admissible as evidence of his guilt. That, of course, does not mean that 
the confession must necessarily be admitted into evidence. In many ju-
risdictions there are rules that are designed primarily to protect against 
the admission of evidence with questionable probative value.200 
 Similarly, this conception of the Nemo tenetur principle suggests that 
the confession in the truth serum case also did not violate the suspect’s 
right against self-incrimination and is, therefore, also admissible. In this 
example, the police had no reason to know the suspect was under the 
influence of a truth serum, so there is no question of whether they used 
unacceptable methods of interrogation to obtain the confession. If the 
police had administered the drug in order to obtain a confession or if 
they had reason to know that the subject was under the effects of the 
drug, then the analysis would be different.201 
 Finally, it seems that the confession secured in the unnecessary threat 
case was obtained in a manner incompatible with the Nemo tenetur prin-
ciple. Despite the fact that the suspect’s statement in this case was en-
tirely voluntary and highly trustworthy, the interrogation techniques 
used by the police to obtain the confession were repugnant. This alone 
should be enough to justify not admitting the confession into evidence. 
The difficulty of explaining this conclusion by appealing to the confes-
sion’s voluntariness or trustworthiness counts as a powerful reason in 
favor of understanding the Nemo tenetur principle as a safeguard against 
the use of inappropriate methods of interrogation rather than as a 
mechanism for securing the reliability or voluntariness of confessions. 
                                                                                                                      
200 See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 111–13 (1934) (holding that the State’s use 
of testimony known by prosecuting authorities to be false is a denial of due process). 
201 See supra Part III (explaining that the purposeful exploitation of a helpless suspect 
is improper and must be barred under the Nemo tenetur principle). 
